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ABSTRACT
Existing black-box attacks on deep neural networks (DNNs) so far have largely
focused on transferability, where an adversarial instance generated for a locally
trained model can “transfer” to attack other learning models. In this paper, we
propose novel Gradient Estimation black-box attacks for adversaries with query
access to the target model’s class probabilities, which do not rely on transferability.
We also propose strategies to decouple the number of queries required to generate
each adversarial sample from the dimensionality of the input. An iterative variant
of our attack achieves close to 100% adversarial success rates for both targeted and
untargeted attacks on DNNs. We carry out extensive experiments for a thorough
comparative evaluation of black-box attacks and show that the proposed Gradient
Estimation attacks outperform all transferability based black-box attacks we tested
on both MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets, achieving adversarial success rates similar
to well known, state-of-the-art white-box attacks. We also apply the Gradient
Estimation attacks successfully against a real-world Content Moderation classifier
hosted by Clarifai. Furthermore, we evaluate black-box attacks against state-of-the-
art defenses. We show that the Gradient Estimation attacks are very effective even
against these defenses.
1 INTRODUCTION
The ubiquity of machine learning provides adversaries with both opportunities and incentives to
develop strategic approaches to fool learning systems and achieve their malicious goals. Many attack
strategies devised so far to generate adversarial examples to fool learning systems have been in the
white-box setting, where adversaries are assumed to have access to the learning model (Szegedy
et al. (2014); Goodfellow et al. (2015); Carlini & Wagner (2017); Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. (2015)).
However, in many realistic settings, adversaries may only have black-box access to the model, i.e.
they have no knowledge about the details of the learning system such as its parameters, but they may
have query access to the model’s predictions on input samples, including class probabilities. For
example, we find this to be the case in some popular commercial AI offerings, such as those from
IBM, Google and Clarifai. With access to query outputs such as class probabilities, the training loss
of the target model can be found, but without access to the entire model, the adversary cannot access
the gradients required to carry out white-box attacks.
Most existing black-box attacks on DNNs have focused on transferability based attacks (Papernot
et al. (2016); Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. (2016); Papernot et al. (2017)), where adversarial examples
crafted for a local surrogate model can be used to attack the target model to which the adversary has
no direct access. The exploration of other black-box attack strategies is thus somewhat lacking so
far in the literature. In this paper, we design powerful new black-box attacks using limited query
access to learning systems which achieve adversarial success rates close to that of white-box attacks.
These black-box attacks help us understand the extent of the threat posed to deployed systems by
adversarial samples. The code to reproduce our results can be found at https://github.com/
sunblaze-ucb/blackbox-attacks.
New black-box attacks. We propose novel Gradient Estimation attacks on DNNs, where the
adversary is only assumed to have query access to the target model. These attacks do not need any
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Figure 1: Sample adversarial images of Gradient Estimation attacks on Clarifai’s Content Moderation
model. Left: original image, classified as ‘drug’ with a confidence of 0.99. Right: adversarial sample
with  = 32, classified as ‘safe’ with a confidence of 0.96.
access to a representative dataset or any knowledge of the target model architecture. In the Gradient
Estimation attacks, the adversary adds perturbations proportional to the estimated gradient, instead
of the true gradient as in white-box attacks (Goodfellow et al. (2015); Kurakin et al. (2016)). Since
the direct Gradient Estimation attack requires a number of queries on the order of the dimension
of the input, we explore strategies for reducing the number of queries to the target model. We also
experimented with Simultaneous Perturbation Stochastic Approximation (SPSA) and Particle Swarm
Optimization (PSO) as alternative methods to carry out query-based black-box attacks but found
Gradient Estimation to work the best.
Query-reduction strategies We propose two strategies: random feature grouping and principal
component analysis (PCA) based query reduction. In our experiments with the Gradient Estimation
attacks on state-of-the-art models on MNIST (784 dimensions) and CIFAR-10 (3072 dimensions)
datasets, we find that they match white-box attack performance, achieving attack success rates up
to 90% for single-step attacks in the untargeted case and up to 100% for iterative attacks in both
targeted and untargeted cases. We achieve this performance with just 200 to 800 queries per sample
for single-step attacks and around 8,000 queries for iterative attacks. This is much fewer than the
closest related attack by Chen et al. (2017). While they achieve similar success rates as our attack,
the running time of their attack is up to 160× longer for each adversarial sample (see Section 3.5). A
further advantage of the Gradient Estimation attack is that it does not require the adversary to train a
local model, which could be an expensive and complex process for real-world datasets, in addition to
the fact that training such a local model may require even more queries based on the training data.
Attacking real-world systems. To demonstrate the effectiveness of our Gradient Estimation attacks
in the real world, we also carry out a practical black-box attack using these methods against the Not
Safe For Work (NSFW) classification and Content Moderation models developed by Clarifai, which
we choose due to their socially relevant application. These models have begun to be deployed for
real-world moderation (Liu, 2016), which makes such black-box attacks especially pernicious. We
carry out these attacks with no knowledge of the training set. We have demonstrated successful attacks
(Figure 1) with just around 200 queries per image, taking around a minute per image. In Figure 1, the
target model classifies the adversarial image as ‘safe’ with high confidence, in spite of the content that
had to be moderated still being clearly visible. We note here that due to the nature of the images we
experiment with, we only show one example here, as the others may be offensive to readers. The full set
of images can be found at https://sunblaze-ucb.github.io/blackbox-attacks/.
Comparative evaluation of black-box attacks. We carry out a thorough empirical comparison of
various black-box attacks (given in Table 7) on both MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets. We study
attacks that require zero queries to the learning model, including the addition of perturbations that
are either random or proportional to the difference of means of the original and targeted classes,
as well as various transferability based black-box attacks. We show that the proposed Gradient
Estimation attacks outperform other black-box attacks in terms of attack success rate and achieve
results comparable with white-box attacks.
In addition, we also evaluate the effectiveness of these attacks on DNNs made more robust using
adversarial training (Goodfellow et al., 2015; Szegedy et al., 2014) and its recent variants including
ensemble adversarial training (Tramèr et al., 2017a) and iterative adversarial training (Ma˛dry et al.,
2017). We find that although standard and ensemble adversarial training confer some robustness
against single-step attacks, they are vulnerable to iterative Gradient Estimation attacks, with ad-
versarial success rates in excess of 70% for both targeted and untargeted attacks. We find that our
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methods outperform other black-box attacks and achieve performance comparable to white-box
attacks. Iterative adversarial training is quite robust against all black-box attacks we test.
In summary, our contributions include:
1. We propose new Gradient Estimation black-box attacks using queries to the target model.
We also investigate two methods to make the number of queries needed independent of the
input dimensionality.
2. We conduct a thorough evaluation of 10 different black-box attack strategies on state-of-
the-art classifiers on the MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets, and we find that with a small
number of queries, our proposed Gradient Estimation attacks outperform transferability
based attacks and achieve attack success rates matching those of white-box attacks.
3. We carry out practical black-box attacks on Clarifai’s Not Safe For Work (NSFW) classifi-
cation and Content Moderation models through public APIs, and show that the generated
adversarial examples can mislead these models with high confidence.
4. Finally, we evaluate these black-box attacks against state-of-the-art adversarial training
based defenses on DNNs, and we find that both standard and ensemble adversarial training
are not robust against Gradient Estimation attacks. Further, even against iterative adversarial
training our methods outperform transferability based attacks.
Related Work. Existing black-box attacks that do not use a local model were first proposed for
convex inducing two-class classifiers by Nelson et al. (2012). For malware data, Xu et al. (2016) use
genetic algorithms to craft adversarial samples, while Dang et al. (2017) use hill climbing algorithms.
These methods are prohibitively expensive for non-categorical and high-dimensional data such as
images. Papernot et al. (2017) proposed using queries to a target model to train a local surrogate
model, which was then used to to generate adversarial samples. This attack relies on transferability.
To the best of our knowledge, the only previous literature on query-based black-box attacks in the
deep learning setting is independent work by Narodytska & Kasiviswanathan (2016) and Chen et al.
(2017).
Narodytska & Kasiviswanathan (2016) propose a greedy local search to generate adversarial samples
by perturbing randomly chosen pixels and using those which have a large impact on the output
probabilities. Their method uses 500 queries per iteration, and the greedy local search is run for
around 150 iterations for each image, resulting in a total of 75,000 queries per image, which is
much higher than any of our attacks. Further, we find that our methods achieve higher targeted and
untargeted attack success rates on both MNIST and CIFAR-10 as compared to their method. Chen
et al. (2017) propose a black-box attack method named ZOO, which also uses the method of finite
differences to estimate the derivative of a function. However, while we propose attacks that compute
an adversarial perturbation, approximating FGSM and iterative FGS; ZOO approximates the Adam
optimizer, while trying to perform coordinate descent on the loss function proposed by Carlini &
Wagner (2017). Neither of these works demonstrates the effectiveness of their attacks on real-world
systems or on state-of-the-art defenses.
2 BACKGROUND AND EVALUATION SETUP
In this section, we will first introduce the notation we use throughout the paper and then describe
the evaluation setup and metrics used in the remainder of the paper. The full set of attacks that was
evaluated is given in Table 7 in Appendix C, which also provides a taxonomy for black-box attacks.
2.1 NOTATION
A classifier f(·; θ) : X → Y is a function mapping from the domain X to the set of classification
outputs Y . (Y = {0, 1} in the case of binary classification, i.e. Y is the set of class labels.) The
number of possible classification outputs is then |Y|. θ is the set of parameters associated with a
classifier. Throughout, the target classifier is denoted as f(·; θ), but the dependence on θ is dropped
if it is clear from the context. H denotes the constraint set which an adversarial sample must satisfy.
`f (x, y) is used to represent the loss function for the classifier f with respect to inputs x ∈ X and
their true labels y ∈ Y . The loss functions we use are the standard cross-entropy loss (denoted
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xent) and the logit loss from Carlini & Wagner (2017) (denoted as logit). These are described in
Section 3.1.
An adversary can generate adversarial example xadv from a benign sample x by adding an appropriate
perturbation of small magnitude (Szegedy et al., 2014). Such an adversarial example xadv will either
cause the classifier to misclassify it into a targeted class (targeted attack), or any class other than the
ground truth class (untargeted attack).
Since the black-box attacks we analyze focus on neural networks in particular, we also define some
notation specifically for neural networks. The outputs of the penultimate layer of a neural network
f , representing the output of the network computed sequentially over all preceding layers, are
known as the logits. We represent the logits as a vector φf (x) ∈ R|Y|. The final layer of a neural
network f used for classification is usually a softmax layer represented as a vector of probabilities
pf (x) = [pf1 (x), . . . , p
f
|Y|(x)], with
∑|Y|
i=1 p
f
i (x) = 1 and p
f
i (x) =
eφ
f
i
(x)∑|Y|
j=1 e
φ
f
j
(x)
.
2.2 EVALUATION SETUP
The empirical evaluation carried out in Sections 6 and 3 is on state-of-the-art neural networks on the
MNIST (LeCun & Cortes, 1998) and CIFAR-10 (Krizhevsky & Hinton, 2009) datasets. The details
of the datasets and the architecture and training procedure for all models are given below.
2.2.1 DATASETS
MNIST. This is a dataset of images of handwritten digits (LeCun & Cortes, 1998). There are 60,000
training examples and 10,000 test examples. Each image belongs to a single class from 0 to 9. The
images have a dimension d of 28 × 28 pixels (total of 784) and are grayscale. Each pixel value
lies in [0, 1]. The digits are size-normalized and centered. This dataset is used commonly as a
‘sanity-check’ or first-level benchmark for state-of-the-art classifiers. We use this dataset since it has
been extensively studied from the attack perspective by previous work.
CIFAR-10. This is a dataset of color images from 10 classes (Krizhevsky & Hinton, 2009). The
images belong to 10 mutually exclusive classes (airplane, automobile, bird, cat, deer, dog, frog, horse,
ship, and truck). There are 50,000 training examples and 10,000 test examples. There are exactly
6,000 examples in each class. The images have a dimension of 32× 32 pixels (total of 1024) and
have 3 channels (Red, Green, and Blue). Each pixel value lies in [0, 255].
2.2.2 MODEL TRAINING DETAILS
In this section, we present the architectures and training details for both the normally and adversarially
trained variants of the models on both the MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets. The accuracy of each
model on benign data is given in Table 4.
MNIST. Each pixel of the MNIST image data is scaled to [0, 1]. We trained four different models on
the MNIST dataset, denoted Models A to D, which are used by Tramèr et al. (2017a) and represent
a good variety of architectures. For the attacks constrained with the L∞ distance, we vary the
adversary’s perturbation budget  from 0 to 0.4, since at a perturbation budget of 0.5, any image can
be made solid gray. The model details for the 4 models trained on the MNIST dataset are as follows:
1. Model A (3,382,346 parameters): Conv(64, 5, 5) + Relu, Conv(64, 5, 5) + Relu,
Dropout(0.25), FC(128) + Relu, Dropout(0.5), FC + Softmax
2. Model B (710,218 parameters) - Dropout(0.2), Conv(64, 8, 8) + Relu, Conv(128, 6, 6) +
Relu, Conv(128, 5, 5) + Relu, Dropout(0.5), FC + Softmax
3. Model C (4,795,082 parameters) - Conv(128, 3, 3) + Relu, Conv(64, 3, 3) + Relu,
Dropout(0.25), FC(128) + Relu, Dropout(0.5), FC + Softmax
4. Model D (509,410 parameters) - [FC(300) + Relu, Dropout(0.5)] × 4, FC + Softmax
Models A and C have both convolutional layers as well as fully connected layers. They also have the
same order of magnitude of parameters. Model B, on the other hand, does not have fully connected
layers and has an order of magnitude fewer parameters. Similarly, Model D has no convolutional
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layers and has fewer parameters than all the other models. Models A, B, and C all achieve greater
than 99% classification accuracy on the test data. Model D achieves 97.2% classification accuracy,
due to the lack of convolutional layers.
CIFAR-10. Each pixel of the CIFAR-10 image data is in [0, 255]. We choose three model architec-
tures for this dataset, which we denote as Resnet-32, Resnet-28-10 (ResNet variants (He et al.,
2016; Zagoruyko & Komodakis, 2016)), and . For the attacks constrained with the L∞ distance, we
vary the adversary’s perturbation budget  from 0 to 28.
As their name indicates, Resnet-32 and Resnet-28-10 are ResNet variants (He et al., 2016;
Zagoruyko & Komodakis, 2016), while Std.-CNN is a standard CNN (TensorFlow Authors, b). In
particular, Resnet-32 is a standard 32 layer ResNet with no width expansion, and Resnet-28-10 is
a wide ResNet with 28 layers with the width set to 10, based on the best performing ResNet from
Zagoruyko & Komodakis (TensorFlow Authors, a). The width indicates the multiplicative factor by
which the number of filters in each residual layer is increased. Std.-CNN is a standard CNN1 from
Tensorflow (Abadi et al., 2015) with two convolutional layers, each followed by a max-pooling and
normalization layer and two fully connected layers, each of which has weight decay.
Resnet-32 is trained for 125,000 steps, Resnet-28-10 is trained for 167,000 steps and Std.-CNN is
trained for 100,000 steps on the benign training data. Models Resnet-32 and Resnet-28-10 are
much more accurate than Std.-CNN. All models were trained with a batch size of 128. The two
ResNets achieve close to state-of-the-art accuracy (Benenson, 2016) on the CIFAR-10 test set, with
Resnet-32 at 92.4% and Resnet-28-10 at 94.4%. Std.-CNN, on the other hand, only achieves an
accuracy of 81.4%, reflecting its simple architecture and the complexity of the task.
2.3 METRICS
Throughout the paper, we use standard metrics to characterize the effectiveness of various attack
strategies. For MNIST, all metrics for single-step attacks are computed with respect to the test set
consisting of 10,000 samples, while metrics for iterative attacks are computed with respect to the first
1,000 samples from the test set. For the CIFAR-10 data, we choose 1,000 random samples from the
test set for single-step attacks and a 100 random samples for iterative attacks. In our evaluations of
targeted attacks, we choose target T for each sample uniformly at random from the set of classification
outputs, except the true class y of that sample.
Attack success rate. The main metric, the attack success rate, is the fraction of samples that meets
the adversary’s goal: f(xadv) 6= y for untargeted attacks and f(xadv) = T for targeted attacks with
target T (Szegedy et al., 2014; Tramèr et al., 2017a). Alternative evaluation metrics are discussed in
Appendix A.
Average distortion. We also evaluate the average distortion for adversarial examples using average
L2 distance between the benign samples and the adversarial ones as suggested by Gu & Rigazio
(2014): ∆(Xadv,X) = 1N
∑N
i=1 ‖(Xadv)i − (X)i‖2 where N is the number of samples. This metric
allows us to compare the average distortion for attacks which achieve similar attack success rates,
and therefore infer which one is stealthier.
Number of queries. Query based black-box attacks make queries to the target model, and this
metric may affect the cost of mounting the attack. This is an important consideration when attacking
real-world systems which have costs associated with the number of queries made.
3 QUERY BASED ATTACKS: GRADIENT ESTIMATION ATTACK
Deployed learning systems often provide feedback for input samples provided by the user. Given query
feedback, different adaptive, query-based algorithms can be applied by adversaries to understand
the system and iteratively generate effective adversarial examples to attack it. Formal definitions of
query-based attacks are in Appendix B. We initially explored a number of methods of using query
feedback to carry out black-box attacks including Particle Swarm Optimization (Kennedy, 2011) and
Simultaneous Perturbation Stochastic Approximation (Spall, 1992). However, these methods were
1https://github.com/tensorflow/models/tree/master/tutorials/image/
cifar10
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not effective at finding adversarial examples for reasons detailed in Section 3.6, which also contains
the results obtained.
Given the fact that many white-box attacks for generating adversarial examples are based on gradient
information, we then tried directly estimating the gradient to carry out black-box attacks, and found
it to be very effective in a range of conditions. In other words, the adversary can approximate
white-box Single-step and Iterative FGSM attacks (Goodfellow et al., 2015; Kurakin et al., 2016)
using estimates of the losses that are needed to carry out those attacks. We first propose a Gradient
Estimation black-box attack based on the method of finite differences (Spall, 2005). The drawback
of a naive implementation of the finite difference method, however, is that it requires O(d) queries
per input, where d is the dimension of the input. This leads us to explore methods such as random
grouping of features and feature combination using components obtained from Principal Component
Analysis (PCA) to reduce the number of queries.
Threat model and justification: We assume that the adversary can obtain the vector of output
probabilities for any input x. The set of queries the adversary can make is then Qf = {pf (x), ∀x}.
Note that an adversary with access to the softmax probabilities will be able to recover the logits up to
an additive constant, by taking the logarithm of the softmax probabilities. For untargeted attacks, the
adversary only needs access to the output probabilities for the two most likely classes.
A compelling reason for assuming this threat model for the adversary is that many existing cloud-
based ML services allow users to query trained models (Watson Visual Recognition, Clarifai, Google
Vision API). The results of these queries are confidence scores which can be used to carry out
Gradient Estimation attacks. These trained models are often deployed by the clients of these ML as a
service (MLaaS) providers (Liu (2016)). Thus, an adversary can pose as a user for a MLaaS provider
and create adversarial examples using our attack, which can then be used against any client of that
provider.
Comparing against existing black-box attacks: In the results presented in this section, we compare
our attacks against a number of existing black-box attacks in both ther targeted and untargeted case.
Detailed descriptions of these attacks are in Section 6. In particular, we compare against the following
attacks that make zero queries to the target model:
1. Baseline attacks: Random-Gaussian perturbations denoted as Rand. (Section 6.1.1) and
Difference-of-Means aligned perturbations denoted as D. of M. (Section 6.1.2)
2. Transferability attack (single local model) (Section 6.3.1) using Fast Gradient Sign (FGS)
and Iterative FGS (IFGS) samples generated on a single source model for both loss functions.
This is denoted as Transfer model FGS/IFGS-loss); e.g., Transfer Model A FGS-logit
3. Transferability attack (local model ensemble) (Section 6.3.2) using FGS and IFGS samples
generated on a source model for both loss functions (Transfer models FGS/IFGS-loss);
e.g., Transfer Model B, Model C IFGS-logit
We also compare against white-box attacks, descriptions of which are in Section 6.2 and results are in
Appendix D.
3.1 FINITE DIFFERENCE METHOD FOR GRADIENT ESTIMATION
In this section, we focus on the method of finite differences to carry out Gradient Estimation based
attacks. Let the function whose gradient is being estimated be g(x). The input to the function is a
d-dimensional vector x, whose elements are represented as xi, where i ∈ [1, . . . , d]. The canonical
basis vectors are represented as ei, where ei is 1 only in the ith component and 0 everywhere else.
Then, a two-sided estimation of the gradient of g with respect to x is given by
FDx(g(x), δ) =

g(x+δe1)−g(x−δe1)
2δ
...
g(x+δed)−g(x−δed)
2δ
 . (1)
δ is a free parameter that controls the accuracy of the estimation. A one-sided approximation can
also be used, but will be less accurate (Wright & Nocedal, 1999). If the gradient of the function g
exists, then limδ→0 FDx(g(x), δ) = ∇xg(x). The finite difference method is useful for a black-box
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adversary aiming to approximate a gradient based attack, since the gradient can be directly estimated
with access to only the function values.
3.1.1 APPROXIMATE FGS WITH FINITE DIFFERENCES
In the untargeted FGS method, the gradient is usually taken with respect to the cross-entropy loss
between the true label of the input and the softmax probability vector. The cross-entropy loss of a
network f at an input x is then `f (x, y) = −
∑|Y|
j=1 1[j = y] log p
f
j (x) = − log pfy(x), where y is
the index of the original class of the input. The gradient of `f (x, y) is
∇x`f (x, y) = −
∇xpfy(x)
pfy(x)
. (2)
An adversary with query access to the softmax probabilities then just has to estimate the gradient of
pfy(x) and plug it into Eq. 2 to get the estimated gradient of the loss. The adversarial sample thus
generated is
xadv = x+  · sign
(
FDx(pfy(x), δ)
pfy(x)
)
. (3)
This method of generating adversarial samples is denoted as FD-xent. Targeted black-box adversarial
samples generated using the Gradient Estimation method are then
xadv = x−  · sign
(
FDx(p
f
T (x), δ)
pfT (x)
)
. (4)
The targeted version of the method is denoted as FD-xent-T.
3.1.2 ESTIMATING THE LOGIT-BASED LOSS
We also use a loss function based on logits which was found to work well for white-box attacks by
Carlini & Wagner (2017). The loss function is given by
`(x, y) = max(φ(x+ δ)y −max{φ(x+ δ)i : i 6= y},−κ), (5)
where y represents the ground truth label for the benign sample x and φ(·) are the logits. κ is a
confidence parameter that can be adjusted to control the strength of the adversarial perturbation. If the
confidence parameter κ is set to 0, the logit loss is max(φ(x+ δ)y −max{φ(x+ δ)i : i 6= y}, 0).
For an input that is correctly classified, the first term is always greater than 0, and for an incorrectly
classified input, an untargeted attack is not meaningful to carry out. Thus, the loss term reduces to
φ(x+ δ)y −max{φ(x+ δ)i : i 6= y} for relevant inputs.
An adversary can compute the logit values up to an additive constant by taking the logarithm of the
softmax probabilities, which are assumed to be available in this threat model. Since the loss function
is equal to the difference of logits, the additive constant is canceled out. Then, the finite differences
method can be used to estimate the difference between the logit values for the original class y, and the
second most likely class y′, i.e., the one given by y′ = argmaxi6=y φ(x)i. The untargeted adversarial
sample generated for this loss in the white-box case is xadv = x+  · sign(∇x(φ(x)y′ − φ(x)y)).
Similarly, in the case of a black-box adversary with query-access to the softmax probabilities, the
adversarial sample is
xadv = x+  · sign(FDx(φ(x)y′ − φ(x)y, δ)). (6)
Similarly, a targeted adversarial sample is
xadv = x−  · sign(FDx(max(φ(x)i : i 6= T )− φ(x)T , δ)). (7)
The untargeted attack method is denoted as FD-logit while the targeted version is denoted as FD-
logit-T.
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MNIST Baseline Gradient Estimation using Finite Differences Transfer from Model B
Single-step Iterative Single-step Iterative
Model D. of M. Rand. FD-xent FD-logit IFD-xent IFD-logit FGS-xent FGS-logit IFGS-xent IFGS-logit
A 44.8 (5.6) 8.5 (6.1) 51.6 (3.3) 92.9 (6.1) 75.0 (3.6) 100.0 (2.1) 66.3 (6.2) 80.8 (6.3) 89.8 (4.75) 88.5 (4.75)
B 81.5 (5.6) 7.8 (6.1) 69.2 (4.5) 98.9 (6.3) 86.7 (3.9) 100.0 (1.6) - - - -
C 20.2 (5.6) 4.1 (6.1) 60.5 (3.8) 86.1 (6.2) 80.2 (4.5) 100.0 (2.2) 49.5 (6.2) 57.0 (6.3) 79.5 (4.75) 78.7 (4.75)
D 97.1 (5.6) 38.5 (6.1) 95.4 (5.8) 100.0 (6.1) 98.4 (5.4) 100.0 (1.2) 76.3 (6.2) 87.6 (6.3) 73.3 (4.75) 71.4 (4.75)
CIFAR-10 Baseline Gradient Estimation using Finite Differences Transfer from Resnet-28-10
Single-step Iterative Single-step Iterative
Model D. of M. Rand. FD-xent FD-logit IFD-xent IFD-logit FGS-xent FGS-logit IFGS-xent IFGS-logit
Resnet-32 9.3 (440.5) 19.4 (439.4) 49.1 (217.1) 86.0 (410.3) 62.0 (149.9) 100.0 (65.7) 74.5 (439.4) 76.6 (439.4) 99.0 (275.4) 98.9 (275.6)
Resnet-28-10 6.7 (440.5) 17.1 (439.4) 50.1 (214.8) 88.2 (421.6) 46.0 (120.4) 100.0 (74.9) - - - -
Std.-CNN 20.3 (440.5) 22.2 (439.4) 80.0 (341.3) 98.9 (360.9) 66.0 (202.5) 100.0 (79.9) 37.4 (439.4) 37.7 (439.4) 33.7 (275.4) 33.6 (275.6)
Table 1: Untargeted black-box attacks: Each entry has the attack success rate for the attack
method given in that column on the model in each row. The number in parentheses for each entry
is ∆(X,Xadv), the average distortion over all samples used in the attack. In each row, the entry in
bold represents the black-box attack with the best performance on that model. Gradient Estimation
using Finite Differences is our method, which has performance matching white-box attacks. Above:
MNIST, L∞ constraint of  = 0.3. Below: CIFAR-10, L∞ constraint of  = 8.
MNIST Baseline Gradient Estimation using Finite Differences Transfer from Model B
Single-step Iterative Single-step Iterative
Model D. of M. FD-xent FD-logit IFD-xent IFD-logit FGS-xent FGS-logit IFGS-xent IFGS-logit
A 15.0 (5.6) 30.0 (6.0) 29.9 (6.1) 100.0 (4.2) 99.7 (2.7) 18.3 (6.3) 18.1 (6.3) 54.5 (4.6) 46.5 (4.2)
B 35.5 (5.6) 29.5 (6.3) 29.3 (6.3) 99.9 (4.1) 98.7 (2.4) - - - -
C 5.84 (5.6) 34.1 (6.1) 33.8 (6.4) 100.0 (4.3) 99.8 (3.0) 14.0 (6.3) 13.8 (6.3) 34.0 (4.6) 26.1 (4.2)
D 59.8 (5.6) 61.4 (6.3) 60.8 (6.3) 100.0 (3.7) 99.9 (1.9) 16.8 (6.3) 16.7 (6.3) 36.4 (4.6) 32.8 (4.1)
CIFAR-10 Baseline Gradient Estimation using Finite Differences Transfer from Resnet-28-10
Single-step Iterative Single-step Iterative
Model D. of M. FD-xent FD-logit IFD-xent IFD-logit FGS-xent FGS-logit IFGS-xent IFGS-logit
Resnet-32 1.2 (440.3) 23.8 (439.5) 23.0 (437.0) 100.0 (110.9) 100.0 (89.5) 15.8 (439.4) 15.5 (439.4) 71.8 (222.5) 80.3 (242.6)
Resnet-28-10 0.9 (440.3) 29.2 (439.4) 28.0 (436.1) 100.0 (123.2) 100.0 (98.3) - - - -
Std.-CNN 2.6 (440.3) 44.5 (439.5) 40.3 (434.9) 99.0 (178.8) 95.0 (126.8) 5.6 (439.4) 5.6 (439.4) 5.1 (222.5) 5.9 (242.6)
Table 2: Targeted black-box attacks: adversarial success rates. The number in parentheses () for
each entry is ∆(X,Xadv), the average distortion over all samples used in the attack. Above: MNIST,
 = 0.3. Below: CIFAR-10,  = 8.
3.1.3 ITERATIVE ATTACKS WITH ESTIMATED GRADIENTS
The iterative variant of the gradient based attack described in Section 6.2 is a powerful attack that
often achieves much higher attack success rates in the white-box setting than the simple single-step
gradient based attacks. Thus, it stands to reason that a version of the iterative attack with estimated
gradients will also perform better than the single-step attacks described until now. An iterative attack
with t+ 1 iterations using the cross-entropy loss is:
xt+1adv = ΠH
(
xtadv + α · sign
(
FDxtadvp
f
y(x
t
adv)
pfy(xtadv)
))
, (8)
where α is the step size andH is the constraint set for the adversarial sample. This attack is denoted
as IFD-xent. If the logit loss is used instead, it is denoted as IFD-logit.
3.1.4 EVALUATION OF GRADIENT ESTIMATION USING FINITE DIFFERENCES
In this section, we summarize the results obtained using Gradient Estimation attacks with Finite
Differences and describe the parameter choices made.
FD-logit and IFD-logit match white-box attack adversarial success rates: The Gradient Estima-
tion attack with Finite Differences (FD-logit) is the most successful untargeted single-step black-box
attack for MNIST and CIFAR-10 models. It significantly outperforms transferability-based attacks
(Table 1) and closely tracks white-box FGS with a logit loss (WB FGS-logit) on MNIST and CIFAR-
10 (Figure 2). For adversarial samples generated iteratively, the Iterative Gradient Estimation attack
with Finite Differences (IFD-logit) achieves 100% adversarial success rate across all models on both
datasets (Table 1). We used 0.3 for the value of  for the MNIST dataset and 8 for the CIFAR-10
dataset. The average distortion for both FD-logit and IFD-logit closely matches their white-box
counterparts, FGS-logit and IFGS-logit as given in Table 8.
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Figure 2: Effectiveness of various single step black-box attacks on Model A (MNIST) and
Resnet-32 (CIFAR-10). The y-axis for both figures gives the variation in adversarial success as 
is increased. The most successful black-box attack strategy in both cases is the Gradient Estimation
attack using Finite Differences with the logit loss (FD-logit), which coincides almost exactly with the
white-box FGS attack with the logit loss (WB FGS-logit). Also, the Gradient Estimation attack with
query reduction using PCA (GE-QR (PCA-k, logit)) performs well for both datasets as well.
FD-T and IFD-T achieve the highest adversarial success rates in the targeted setting: For tar-
geted black-box attacks, IFD-xent-T achieves 100% adversarial success rates on almost all models as
shown by the results in Table 2. While FD-xent-T only achieves about 30% adversarial success rates,
this matches the performance of single-step white-box attacks such as FGS-xent-T and FGS-logit-T
(Table 9). The average distortion for samples generated using gradient estimation methods is similar
with that of white-box attacks.
Parameter choices: We use δ = 1.0 for FD-xent and IFD-xent for both datasets, while using
δ = 0.01 for FD-logit and IFD-logit. We find that a larger value of δ is needed for xent loss based
attacks to work. The reason for this is that the probability values used in the xent loss are not as
sensitive to changes as in the logit loss, and thus the gradient cannot be estimated since the function
value does not change at all when a single pixel is perturbed. For the Iterative Gradient Estimation
attacks using Finite Differences, we use α = 0.01 and t = 40 for the MNIST results and α = 1.0
and t = 10 for CIFAR-10 throughout. The same parameters are used for the white-box Iterative FGS
attack results given in Appendix D. This translates to 62720 queries for MNIST (40 steps of iteration)
and 61440 queries (10 steps of iteration) for CIFAR-10 per sample. We find these choices work well,
and keep the running time of the Gradient Estimation attacks at a manageable level. However, we find
that we can achieve similar adversarial success rates with much fewer queries using query reduction
methods which we describe in the next section.
3.2 QUERY REDUCTION
The major drawback of the approximation based black-box attacks is that the number of queries
needed per adversarial sample is large. For an input with dimension d, the number of queries will be
exactly 2d for a two-sided approximation. This may be too large when the input is high-dimensional.
So we examine two techniques in order to reduce the number of queries the adversary has to make.
Both techniques involve estimating the gradient for groups of features, instead of estimating it one
feature at a time.
The justification for the use of feature grouping comes from the relation between gradients and
directional derivatives (Hildebrand, 1962) for differentiable functions. The directional derivative of a
function g is defined as∇vg(x) = limh→0 g(x+hv)−g(x)h . It is a generalization of a partial derivative.
For differentiable functions, ∇vg(x) = ∇xg(x) · v, which implies that the directional derivative is
just the projection of the gradient along the direction v. Thus, estimating the gradient by grouping
features is equivalent to estimating an approximation of the gradient constructed by projecting it
along appropriately chosen directions. The estimated gradient ∇ˆxg(x) of any function g can be
computed using the techniques below, and then plugged in to Equations 3 and 6 instead of the finite
difference term to create an adversarial sample. Next, we introduce the techniques applied to group
the features for estimation.
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3.2.1 QUERY REDUCTION BASED ON RANDOM GROUPING
The simplest way to group features is to choose, without replacement, a random set of features. The
gradient can then be simultaneously estimated for all these features. If the size of the set chosen is k,
then the number of queries the adversary has to make is d dk e. When k = 1, this reduces to the case
where the partial derivative with respect to every feature is found, as in Section 3.1. In each iteration
of Algorithm 1, there is a set of indices S according to which v is determined, with vi = 1 if and
only if i ∈ S. Thus, the directional derivative being estimated is∑i∈S ∂g(x)∂xi , which is an average of
partial derivatives. Thus, the quantity being estimated is not the gradient itself, but an index-wise
averaged version of it.
Algorithm 1 Gradient estimation with query reduction using random features
Input: x, k, δ, g(·)
Output: Estimated gradient ∇ˆxg(x) of g(·) at x
1: Initialize empty vector ∇ˆxg(x) of dimension d
2: for i← 1 to d d
k
e − 1 do
3: Choose a set of random k indices Si out of [1, . . . , d]/{∪i−1j=1Sj}
4: Initialize v such that vj = 1 iff j ∈ Si
5: For all j ∈ Si, set ∇ˆxg(x)j = g(x+δv)−g(x−δv)2δk ,which is the two-sided approximation of the directional
derivative along v
6: end for
7: Initialize v such that vj = 1 iff j ∈ [1, . . . , d]/{∪d
d
k
e−1
j=1 Sj}
8: For all j ∈ [1, . . . , d]/{∪d
d
k
e−1
j=1 Sj}, set ∇ˆxg(x)j = g(x+δv)−g(x−δv)2δk
3.2.2 QUERY REDUCTION USING PCA COMPONENTS
A more principled way to reduce the number of queries the adversary has to make to estimate the
gradient is to compute directional derivatives along the principal components as determined by
principal component analysis (PCA) (Shlens, 2014), which requires the adversary to have access to a
set of data which is represetative of the training data. PCA minimizes reconstruction error in terms of
the L2 norm; i.e., it provides a basis in which the Euclidean distance to the original sample from a
sample reconstructed using a subset of the basis vectors is the smallest.
Concretely, let the samples the adversary wants to misclassify be column vectors xi ∈ Rd for
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and letX be the d×nmatrix of centered data samples (i.e. X = [x˜1x˜2 . . . x˜n], where
x˜i = x− 1n
∑n
j=1 x
j). The principal components of X are the normalized eigenvectors of its sample
covariance matrix C = XXT. Since C is a positive semidefinite matrix, there is a decomposition
C = UΛUT where U is an orthogonal matrix, Λ = diag(λ1, . . . , λd), and λ1 ≥ . . . ≥ λd ≥ 0.
Thus, U in Algorithm 2 is the d×dmatrix whose columns are unit eigenvectors ofC. The eigenvalue
λi is the variance of X along the ith component.
Algorithm 2 Gradient estimation with query reduction using PCA components
Input: x, k, U, δ, g(·)
Output: Estimated gradient ∇ˆxg(x) of g(·) at x
1: for i← 1 to k do
2: Initialize v such that v = ui‖ui‖ , where ui is the i
th column of U
3: Compute
αi(v) =
g(x+ δv)− g(x− δv)
2δ
,
which is the two-sided approximation of the directional derivative along v
4: Update ∇ˆxg(x)i = ∇ˆxg(x)i−1 + αi(v)v
5: end for
6: Set ∇ˆxg(x) = ∇ˆxg(x)k
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(a) Gradient Estimation attack with
query reduction using random
grouping and the logit loss (GE-QR
(RG-k, logit)) on Model A (MNIST,
d = 784). The adversarial suc-
cess rate decreases as the number
of groups d d
k
e is decreased, where
k is the size of the group and d is
the dimension of the input.
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(b) Gradient Estimation attack with
query reduction using PCA com-
ponents and the logit loss (GE-
QR (PCA-k, logit)) on Model A
(MNIST, d = 784). The adversarial
success rates decrease as the number
of principal components k used for
estimation is decreased. Relatively
high success rates are maintained
even for k = 50.
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(c) Gradient Estimation attack with
query reduction using PCA com-
ponents and the logit loss (GE-
QR (PCA-k, logit)) on Resnet-32
(CIFAR-10). Relatively high suc-
cess rates are maintained even for
k = 400.
Figure 3: Adversarial success rates for Gradient Estimation attacks with query reduction (FD-
QR (Technique, logit)) on Model A (MNIST) and Resnet-32 (CIFAR-10), where Technique
is either PCA or RG. ‘None’ refers to FD-logit, the case where the number of queries is 2d, where d
is the dimension of the input.
In Algorithm 2, U is the d× d matrix whose columns are the principal components ui, where i ∈ [d].
The quantity being estimated in Algorithm 2 is an approximation of the gradient in the PCA basis:
(∇xg(x))k =
k∑
i=1
(
∇xg(x)T ui‖ui‖
)
ui
‖ui‖ ,
where the term on the left represents an approximation of the true gradient by the sum of its projection
along the top k principal components. In Algorithm 2, the weights of the representation in the PCA
basis are approximated using the approximate directional derivatives along the principal components.
3.3 ITERATIVE ATTACKS WITH QUERY REDUCTION
Performing an iterative attack with the gradient estimated using the finite difference method (Equa-
tion 1) could be expensive for an adversary, needing 2td queries to the target model, for t iterations
with the two-sided finite difference estimation of the gradient. To lower the number of queries needed,
the adversary can use either of the query reduction techniques described above to reduce the number
of queries to 2tk ( k < d). These attacks using the cross-entropy loss are denoted as IGE-QR (RG-k,
xent) for the random grouping technique and IGE-QR (PCA-k, xent) for the PCA-based technique.
3.3.1 EVALUATION OF GRADIENT ESTIMATION ATTACKS WITH QUERY REDUCTION
In this section, we first summarize the results obtained using Gradient Estimation attacks with query
reduction and then provide a more detailed analysis of the effect of dimension on attacks with query
reduction
Gradient estimation with query reduction maintains high attack success rates: For both datasets,
the Gradient Estimation attack with PCA based query reduction (GE-QR (PCA-k, logit)) is effective,
with performance close to that of FD-logit with k = 100 for MNIST (Figure 2a) and k = 400 for
CIFAR-10 (Figure 2b). The Iterative Gradient Estimation attacks with both Random Grouping and
PCA based query reduction (IGE-QR (RG-k, logit) and IGE-QR (PCA-k, logit)) achieve close to
100% success rates for untargeted attacks and above 80% for targeted attacks on Model A on MNIST
and Resnet-32 on CIFAR-10 (Figure 5). Figure 5 clearly shows the effectiveness of the gradient
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estimation attack across models, datasets, and adversarial goals. While random grouping is not as
effective as the PCA based method for Single-step attacks, it is as effective for iterative attacks.
Effect of dimension on Gradient Estimation attacks: We consider the effectiveness of Gradient
Estimation with random grouping based query reduction and the logit loss (GE-QR (RG-k, logit))
on Model A on MNIST data in Figure 3a, where k is the number of indices chosen in each iteration
of Algorithm 1. Thus, as k increases and the number of groups decreases, we expect attack success
to decrease as gradients over larger groups of features are averaged. This is the effect we see in
Figure 3a, where the adversarial success rate drops from 93% to 63% at  = 0.3 as k increases from
1 to 7. Grouping with k = 7 translates to 112 queries per MNIST image, down from 784. Thus, in
order to achieve high adversarial success rates with the random grouping method, larger perturbation
magnitudes are needed.
On the other hand, the PCA-based approach GE-QR (PCA-k, logit) is much more effective, as
can be seen in Figure 3b. Using 100 principal components to estimate the gradient for Model A on
MNIST as in Algorithm 2, the adversarial success rate at  = 0.3 is 88.09%, as compared to 92.9%
without any query reduction. Similarly, using 400 principal components for Resnet-32 on CIFAR-10
(Figure 3c), an adversarial success rate of 66.9% can be achieved at  = 8. At  = 16, the adversarial
success rate rises to 80.1%.
Remarks: While decreasing the number of queries does reduce attack success rates, the proposed
query reduction methods maintain high attack success rates.
3.4 ADVERSARIAL SAMPLES
In Figure 4, we show some examples of successful untargeted adversarial samples against Model A
on MNIST and Resnet-32 on CIFAR-10. These images were generated with an L∞ constraint of
 = 0.3 for MNIST and  = 8 for CIFAR-10. Clearly, the amount of perturbation added by iterative
attacks is much smaller, barely being visible in the images.
WB FGS FD-logit GE-QR-PCA
MNIST
CIFAR-10
CIFAR-10
Single-step
WB IFGS IFD-logit IGE-QR-PCA
MNIST
Iterative
Figure 4: Untargeted adversarial samples on Model A on MNIST and Resnet-32 on CIFAR-10.
All attacks use the logit loss. Perturbations in the images generated using single-step attacks are far
smaller than those for iterative attacks. The ‘7’ from MNIST is classified as a ‘3’ by all single-step
attacks and as a ‘9’ by all iterative attacks. The dog from CIFAR-10 is classified as a bird by the
white-box FGS and Finite Difference attack, and as a frog by the Gradient Estimation attack with
query reduction.
3.5 EFFICIENCY OF GRADIENT ESTIMATION ATTACKS
In our evaluations, all models were run on a GPU with a batch size of 100. On Model A on MNIST
data, single-step attacks FD-xent and FD-logit take 6.2× 10−2 and 8.8× 10−2 seconds per sample
respectively. Thus, these attacks can be carried out on the entire MNIST test set of 10,000 images in
about 10 minutes. For iterative attacks with no query reduction, with 40 iterations per sample (α set
to 0.01), both IFD-xent and IFD-xent-T taking about 2.4 seconds per sample. Similarly, IFD-logit
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Query-based attack Attack success No. of queries Time per sample (s)
Finite Diff. 92.9 (6.1) 1568 8.8× 10−2
Gradient Estimation (RG-8) 61.5 (6.0) 196 1.1× 10−2
Iter. Finite Diff. 100.0 (2.1) 62720 3.5
Iter. Gradient Estimation (RG-8) 98.4 (1.9) 8000 0.43
Particle Swarm Optimization 84.1 (5.3) 10000 21.2
SPSA 96.7 (3.9) 8000 1.25
Table 3: Comparison of untargeted query-based black-box attack methods. All results are for
attacks using the first 1000 samples from the MNIST dataset on Model A and with an L∞ constraint
of 0.3. The logit loss is used for all methods expect PSO, which uses the class probabilities.
and IFD-logit-T take about 3.5 seconds per sample. With query reduction, using IGE-QR (PCA-k,
logit) with k = 100 the time taken is just 0.5 seconds per sample.
For Resnet-32 on the CIFAR-10 dataset, FD-xent, FD-xent-T, FD-logit and FD-logit-T all take
roughly 3s per sample. The iterative variants of these attacks with 10 iterations (α set to 1.0) take
roughly 30s per sample. Using query reduction, IGE-QR (PCA-k, logit) with k = 100 with 10
iterations takes just 5s per sample. The time required per sample increases with the complexity of the
network, which is observed even for white-box attacks.
All the above numbers are for the case when queries are not made in parallel. Our attack algorithm
allows for queries to be made in parallel as well. We find that a simple parallelization of the queries
gives us a 2− 4× speedup. The limiting factor is the fact that the model is loaded on a single GPU,
which implies that the current setup is not fully optimized to take advantage of the inherently parallel
nature of our attack. With further optimization, greater speedups can be achieved.
Remarks: Overall, our attacks are very efficient and allow an adversary to generate a large number
of adversarial samples in a short period of time.
3.6 OTHER QUERY-BASED ATTACKS
We experimented with Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO),2 a commonly used evolutionary opti-
mization strategy, to construct adversarial samples as was done by Sharif et al. (2016), but found it
to be prohibitively slow for a large dataset, and it was unable to achieve high adversarial success
rates even on the MNIST dataset. We also tried to use the Simultaneous Perturbation Stochastic
Approximation (SPSA) method, which is similar to the method of Finite Differences, but it estimates
the gradient of the loss along a random direction r at each step, instead of along the canonical basis
vectors. While each step of SPSA only requires 2 queries to the target model, a large number of steps
are nevertheless required to generate adversarial samples. A single step of SPSA does not reliably
produce adversarial samples. The two main disadvantages of this method are that i) the convergence
of SPSA is much more sensitive in practice to the choice of both δ (gradient estimation step size)
and α (loss minimization step size), and ii) even with the same number of queries as the Gradient
Estimation attacks, the attack success rate is lower even though the distortion is higher.
A comparative evaluation of all the query-based black-box attacks we experimented with for the
MNIST dataset is given in Table 3. The PSO based attack uses class probabilities to define the loss
function, as it was found to work better than the logit loss in our experiments. The attack that achieves
the best trade-off between speed and attack success is IGE-QR (RG-k, logit).
4 ATTACKING DEFENSES
In this section, we evaluate black-box attacks against different defenses based on adversarial training
and its variants. We focus on adversarial training based defenses as they aim to directly improve the
robustness of DNNs, and are among the most effective defenses demonstrated so far in the literature.
2Using freely available code from http://pythonhosted.org/pyswarm/
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MNIST Single-step Iterative
PCA-100 RG-8 PCA-100 RG-8
A 88.1 (6.0) 61.5 (6.0) 99.9 (2.5) 98.4 (1.9)
Aadv-0.3 4.1 (5.8) 2.0 (5.3) 50.7 (4.2) 27.5 (2.4)
CIFAR-10 Single-step Iterative
PCA-400 RG-8 PCA-400 RG-8
Resnet-32 66.9 (410.7) 66.8 (402.7) 98.0 (140.7) 99.0 (80.5)
Resnet-32 adv-8 8.0 (402.1) 7.7 (401.8) 97.0 (151.3) 98.0 (92.9)
(a) Adversarial success rates for untargeted attacks
using query reduction. The parameters used for query
reduction are indicated in the table.
A
Resnet-32
Aadv-0.3
Resnet-32adv-8
0 20 40 60 80 100
Untargeted
Targeted
IGE-QR (PCA-400, logit) across models
Adversarial success (%)
(b) Adversarial success rates of the Iterative Gra-
dient Estimation attack using the logit loss, with
PCA (400) used for query reduction.
Figure 5: Adversarial success rates for query-reduced attacks.  is set to 0.3 for Model A on
MNIST and 8 for Resnet-32 on CIFAR-10. Model Aadv-0.3 and Resnet-32 adv-8 are adversarially
trained variants (ref. Section 4.1) of the models. All attacks use roughly 8000 queries per sample for
both datasets.
We find that Iterative Gradient Estimation attacks perform much better than any single-step black-box
attack against defenses. Nevertheless, in Figure 6, we show that with the addition of an initial random
perturbation to overcome “gradient masking” (Tramèr et al., 2017a), the Gradient Estimation attack
with Finite Differences is the most effective single-step black-box attack on adversarially trained
models on MNIST.
Dataset (Model) Benign Adv Adv-Ens Adv-Iter
MNIST (A) 99.2 99.4 99.2 99.3
CIFAR-10 (Resnet-32) 92.4 92.1 91.7 79.1
Table 4: Accuracy of models on the benign test data
4.1 BACKGROUND AND EVALUATION SETUP
4.1.1 ADVERSARIAL TRAINING
Szegedy et al. (2014) and Goodfellow et al. (2015) introduced the concept of adversarial training,
where the standard loss function for a neural network f is modified as follows:
˜`(x, y) = α`f (x, y) + (1− α)`f (xadv, y), (9)
where y is the true label of the sample x. The underlying objective of this modification is to make the
neural networks more robust by penalizing it during training to count for adversarial samples. During
training, the adversarial samples are computed with respect to the current state of the network using
an appropriate method such as FGSM.
Ensemble adversarial training. Tramèr et al. (2017a) proposed an extension of the adversarial
training paradigm which is called ensemble adversarial training. As the name suggests, in ensemble
adversarial training, the network is trained with adversarial samples from multiple networks.
Iterative adversarial training. A further modification of the adversarial training paradigm proposes
training with adversarial samples generated using iterative methods such as the iterative FGSM attack
described earlier (Ma˛dry et al., 2017).
4.2 ADVERSARIALLY TRAINED MODELS
We train variants of Model A with the 3 adversarial training strategies described above using
adversarial samples based on an L∞ constraint of 0.3. Model Aadv-0.3 is trained with FGS samples,
while Model Aadv-iter-0.3 is trained with iterative FGS samples using t = 40 and α = 0.01. For the
model with ensemble training, Model Aadv-ens-0.3 is trained with pre-generated FGS samples for
Models A, C, and D, as well as FGS samples. The source of the samples is chosen randomly for
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MNIST Baseline Gradient Estimation using Finite Differences Transfer from Model B
Single-step Iterative Single-step Iterative
Model D. of M. Rand. FD-xent FD-logit IFD-xent IFD-logit FGS-xent FGS-logit IFGS-xent IFGS-logit
Model Aadv-0.3 6.5 (5.6) 1.3 (6.1) 10.3 (2.6) 2.8 (5.9) 36.4 (3.1) 76.5 (3.1) 14.6 (6.2) 14.63 (6.3) 16.5 (4.7) 15.9 (4.7)
Model Aadv-ens-0.3 2.0 (5.6) 1.2 (6.1) 6.1 (3.5) 6.2 (6.3) 24.2 (4.1) 96.4 (2.7) 3.1 (6.2) 3.1 (6.3) 4.8 (4.7) 4.9 (4.7)
Model Aadv-iter-0.3 3.0 (5.6) 1.0 (6.1) 9.2 (7.4) 7.5 (7.2) 14.5 (0.96) 11.6 (3.5) 11.5 (6.2) 11.0 (6.3) 8.7 (4.7) 8.2 (4.7)
CIFAR-10 Baseline Gradient Estimation using Finite Differences Transfer from Resnet-28-10
Single-step Iterative Single-step Iterative
Model D. of M. Rand. FD-xent FD-logit IFD-xent IFD-logit FGS-xent FGS-logit IFGS-xent IFGS-logit
Resnet-32 adv-8 9.6 (440.5) 10.9 (439.4) 2.4 (232.9) 8.5 (401.9) 69.0 (136.0) 100.0 (73.8) 13.1 (439.4) 13.2 (439.4) 30.2 (275.4) 30.2 (275.6)
Resnet-32 adv-ens-8 10.1 (440.5) 10.4 (439.4) 7.7 (360.2) 12.2 (399.8) 95.0 (190.4) 100.0 (85.2) 9.7 (439.4) 9.6 (439.4) 15.9 (275.4) 15.5 (275.6)
Resnet-32 adv-iter-8 22.86 (440.5) 21.41 (439.4) 45.5 (365.5) 47.5 (331.1) 55.0 (397.6) 54.6 (196.3) 23.2 (439.4) 23.1 (439.4) 22.3 (275.4) 22.3 (275.6)
Table 5: Untargeted black-box attacks for models with adversarial training: adversarial success
rates and average distortion ∆(X,Xadv) over the samples. Above: MNIST,  = 0.3. Below:
CIFAR-10,  = 8.
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Figure 6: Effectiveness of various single step black-box attacks against adversarially trained
models. On the MNIST model, Model Aadv-0.3 the attack with the highest performance up till  = 0.3
is the Gradient Estimation attack using Finite Differences with initially added randomness. Beyond
this, the Transferability attack (single local model) using samples from Model B performs better. On
the CIFAR-10 model Resnet-32 adv-8, the best performing attack is the Transferability attack (single
local model) using samples from Resnet-28-10.
each minibatch during training. For all adversarially trained models, each training batch contains 128
samples of which 64 are benign and 64 are adversarial samples (either FGSM or iterative FGSM).
This implies that the loss for each is weighted equally during training; i.e., in Eq. 9, α is set to 0.5.
Networks using standard and ensemble adversarial training are trained for 12 epochs, while those
using iterative adversarial training are trained for 64 epochs.
We train variants of Resnet-32 using adversarial samples with an L∞ constraint of 8. Resnet-32
adv-8 is trained with FGS samples with the same constraint, and Resnet-32 ens-adv-8 is trained with
pre-generated FGS samples from Resnet-32 and Std.-CNN as well as FGS samples. Resnet-32
adv-iter-8 is trained with iterative FGS samples using t = 10 and α = 1.0. The adversarial variants of
Resnet-32 is trained for 80,000 steps
Table 4 shows the accuracy of these models with various defenses on benign test data.
4.3 SINGLE-STEP ATTACKS ON DEFENSES
In Figure 6a, we can see that both single-step black-box and white-box attacks have much lower
adversarial success rates on Model Aadv-0.3 as compared to Model A. The success rate of the Gradient
Estimation attacks matches that of white-box attacks on these adversarially trained networks as
well. To overcome this, we add an initial random perturbation to samples before using the Gradient
Estimation attack with Finite Differences and the logit loss (FD-logit). These are then the most
effective single step black-box attacks on Model Aadv-0.3 at  = 0.3 with an adversarial success rate
of 32.2%, surpassing the Transferability attack (single local model) from B.
In Figure 6b, we again see that the Gradient Estimation attacks using Finite Differences (FD-xent
and FD-logit) and white-box FGS attacks (FGS-xent and FGS-logit) against Resnet-32. As 
is increased, the attacks that perform the best are Random Perturbations (Rand.), Difference-of-
means (D. of M.), and Transferability attack (single local model) from Resnet-28-10 with the latter
performing slightly better than the baseline attacks. This is due to the ‘gradient masking’ phenomenon
and can be overcome by adding random perturbations as for MNIST. An interesting effect is observed
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Figure 7: Increasing the effectiveness of FD-logit attacks on Model Aadv-0.3, Model Aadv-ens-0.3
and Model Aadv-iter-0.3 (MNIST) by adding an initial L∞ constrained random perturbation of
magnitude 0.01.
at  = 4, where the adversarial success rate is higher than at  = 8. The likely explanation for this
effect is that the model has overfitted to adversarial samples at  = 8. Our Gradient Estimation attack
closely tracks the adversarial success rate of white-box attacks in this setting as well.
Increasing effectiveness of single-step attacks using initial random perturbation: Since the
Gradient Estimation attack with Finite Differences (FD-xent and FD-logit) were not performing well
due the masking of gradients at the benign sample x, we added an initial random perturbation to
escape this low-gradient region as in the RAND-FGSM attack (Tramèr et al., 2017a). Figure 7 shows
the effect of adding an initial L∞-constrained perturbation of magnitude 0.05. With the addition of
a random perturbation, FD-logit has a much improved adversarial success rate on Model Aadv-0.3,
going up to 32.2% from 2.8% without the perturbation at a total perturbation value of 0.3. It even
outperforms the white-box FGS (FGS-logit) with the same random perturbation added. This effect
is also observed for Model Aadv-ens-0.3, but Model Aadv-iter-0.3 appears to be resistant to single-step
gradient based attacks. Thus, our attacks work well for single-step attacks on DNNs with standard
and ensemble adversarial training, and achieve performance levels close to that of white-box attacks.
4.4 ITERATIVE ATTACKS ON DIFFERENT ADVERSARIAL TRAINING DEFENSES
While single-step black-box attacks are less effective at  lower than the one used for training, our
experiments show that iterative black-box attacks continue to work well even against adversarially
trained networks. For example, the Iterative Gradient Estimation attack using Finite Differences
with a logit loss (IFD-logit) achieves an adversarial success rate of 96.4% against Model Aadv-ens-0.3,
while the best transferability attack has a success rate of 4.9%. It is comparable to the white-box
attack success rate of 93% from Table 10. However, Model Aadv-iter-0.3 is quite robust even against
iterative attacks, with the highest black-box attack success rate achieved being 14.5%.
Further, in Figure 5, we can see that using just 4000 queries per sample, the Iterative Gradient
Estimation attack using PCA for query reduction (IGE-QR (PCA-400, logit)) achieves 100%
(untargeted) and 74.5% (targeted) adversarial success rates against Model Aadv-0.3. Our methods far
outperform the other black-box attacks, as shown in Table 10.
Iterative black-box attacks perform well against adversarially trained models for CIFAR-10 as well.
IFD-logit achieves attack success rates of 100% against both Resnet-32 adv-8 and Resnet-32
adv-ens-8 (Table 5), which reduces slightly to 97% when IFD-QR (PCA-400, logit) is used. This
matches the performance of white-box attacks as given in Table 10. IFD-QR (PCA-400, logit) also
achieves a 72% success rate for targeted attacks at  = 8 as shown in Figure 5.
The iteratively trained model has poor performance on both benign as well as adversarial samples.
Resnet-32 adv-iter-8 has an accuracy of only 79.1% on benign data, as shown in Table 4. The Iterative
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Gradient Estimation attack using Finite Differences with cross-entropy loss (IFD-xent) achieves an
untargeted attack success rate of 55% on this model, which is lower than on the other adversarially
trained models, but still significant. This is in line with the observation by Ma˛dry et al. (2017) that
iterative adversarial training needs models with large capacity for it to be effective. This highlights a
limitation of this defense, since it is not clear what model capacity is needed and the models we use
already have a large number of parameters.
Remarks. Both single-step and iterative variants of the Gradient Estimation attacks outperform
other black-box attacks, achieving attack success rates close to those of white-box attacks even on
adversarially trained models.
5 ATTACKS ON CLARIFAI: A REAL-WORLD SYSTEM
Since the only requirement for carrying out the Gradient Estimation based attacks is query-based
access to the target model, a number of deployed public systems that provide classification as a
service can be used to evaluate our methods. We choose Clarifai, as it has a number of models
trained to classify image datasets for a variety of practical applications, and it provides black-box
access to its models and returns confidence scores upon querying. In particular, Clarifai has models
used for the detection of Not Safe For Work (NSFW) content, as well as for Content Moderation.
These are important applications where the presence of adversarial samples presents a real danger: an
attacker, using query access to the model, could generate an adversarial sample which will no longer
be classified as inappropriate. For example, an adversary could upload violent images, adversarially
modified, such that they are marked incorrectly as ‘safe’ by the Content Moderation model.
We evaluate our attack using the Gradient Estimation method on the Clarifai NSFW and Content
Moderation models. An important point to note here is that given the lack of an easily accessible
open-source dataset for these tasks to train a local surrogate model, carrying out attacks based on
transferability is a challenging task. On the other hand, our attack can directly be used for any image
of the adversary’s choice. The Content Moderation model has five categories, ‘safe’, ‘suggestive’,
‘explicit’, ‘drug’ and ‘gore’, while the NSFW model has just two categories, ‘SFW’ and ‘NSFW.’
When we query the API with an image, it returns the confidence scores associated with each category,
with the confidence scores summing to 1. We use the random grouping technique in order to reduce
the number of queries and take the logarithm of the confidence scores in order to use the logit loss. A
large number of successful attack images can be found at https://sunblaze-ucb.github.
io/blackbox-attacks/. Due to their possibly offensive nature, they are not included in the
paper.
An example of an attack on the Content Moderation API is given in Figure 1, where the original
image on the left is clearly of some kind of drug on a table, with a spoon and a syringe. It is classified
as a drug by the Content Moderation model with a confidence score of 0.99. The image on the right
is an adversarial image generated with 192 queries to the Content Moderation API, with an L∞
constraint on the perturbation of  = 32. While the image can still clearly be classified by a human as
being of drugs on a table, the Content Moderation model now classifies it as ‘safe’ with a confidence
score of 0.96.
Remarks. The proposed Gradient Estimation attacks can successfully generate adversarial examples
that are misclassified by a real-world system hosted by Clarifai without prior knowledge of the
training set or model.
6 EXISTING BLACK-BOX ATTACKS
In this section, we describe existing methods for generating adversarial examples. In all of these
attacks, the adversary’s perturbation is constrained using the L∞ distance.
6.1 BASELINE ATTACKS
Now, we describe two baseline black-box attacks which can be carried out without any knowledge of
or query access to the target model.
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6.1.1 RANDOM PERTURBATIONS
With no knowledge of f or the training set, the simplest manner in which an adversary may seek to
carry out an attack is by adding a random perturbation to the input (Szegedy et al., 2014; Goodfellow
et al., 2015; Fawzi et al., 2015). These perturbations can be generated by any distribution of the
adversary’s choice and constrained according to an appropriate norm. If we let P be a distribution
over X , and p is a random variable drawn according to P , then a noisy sample is just xnoise = x+ p.
Since random noise is added, it is not possible to generate targeted adversarial samples in a principled
manner. This attack is denoted as Rand. throughout.
6.1.2 DIFFERENCE OF MEANS
A perturbation aligned with the difference of means of two classes is likely to be effective for an
adversary hoping to cause misclassification for a broad range of classifiers (Tramèr et al., 2017b).
While these perturbations are far from optimal for DNNs, they provide a useful baseline to compare
against. Adversaries with at least partial access to the training or test sets can carry out this attack.
An adversarial sample generated using this method, and with L∞ constraints, is xadv = x +  ·
sign(µt − µo), where µt is the mean of the target class and µo is the mean of the original ground
truth class. For an untargeted attack, t = argmini d(µi − µo), where d(·, ·) is an appropriately
chosen distance function. In other words, the class whose mean is closest to the original class in terms
of the Euclidean distance is chosen to be the target. This attack is denoted as D. of M. throughout.
6.1.3 EFFECTIVENESS OF BASELINE ATTACKS
In the baseline attacks described above, the choice of distribution for the random perturbation attack
and the choice of distance function for the difference of means attack are not fixed. Here, we describe
the choices we make for both attacks. The random perturbation p for each sample (for both MNIST
and CIFAR-10) is chosen independently according to a multivariate normal distribution with mean 0,
i.e. p ∼ N (0, Id). Then, depending on the norm constraint, either a signed and scaled version of the
random perturbation (L∞) or a scaled unit vector in the direction of the perturbation (L2) is added.
For an untargeted attack utilizing perturbations aligned with the difference of means, for each sample,
the mean of the class closest to the original class in the L2 distance is determined.
As expected, adversarial samples generated using Rand. do not achieve high adversarial success
rates (Table 1) in spite of having similar or larger average distortion than the other black-box attacks
for both the MNIST and CIFAR-10 models. However, the D. of M. method is quite effective at higher
perturbation values for the MNIST dataset as can be seen in Figure 2a. Also, for Models B and D,
the D. of M. attack is more effective than FD-xent. The D. of M. method is less effective in the
targeted attack case, but for Model D, it outperforms the transferability based attack considerably. Its
success rate is comparable to the targeted transferability based attack for Model A as well.
The relative effectiveness of the two baseline methods is reversed for the CIFAR-10 dataset, however,
where Rand. outperforms D. of M. considerably as  is increased. This indicates that the models
trained on MNIST have normal vectors to decision boundaries which are more aligned with the
vectors along the difference of means as compared to the models on CIFAR-10.
6.2 SINGLE-STEP AND ITERATIVE FAST GRADIENT METHODS
Now, we describe two white-box attack methods, used in transferability-based attacks, for which
we constructed approximate, gradient-free versions in Section 3. These attacks are based on either
iterative or single-step gradient based minimization of appropriately defined loss functions of neural
networks. All results for white-box attacks are contained in Appendix D. Since these methods all
require the knowledge of the model’s gradient, we assume the adversary has access to a local model
fs. Adversarial samples generated for fs can then be transferred to the target model f t to carry out
a transferability-based attack (Papernot et al., 2016; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016). An ensemble
of local models (Liu et al., 2017) may also be used. Transferability-based attacks are described in
Section 6.3.
The single-step Fast Gradient method, first introduced by Goodfellow et al. (2015), utilizes a first-
order approximation of the loss function in order to construct adversarial samples for the adversary’s
surrogate local model fs. The samples are constructed by performing a single step of gradient ascent
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for untargeted attacks. Formally, the adversary generates samples xadv with L∞ constraints (known
as the Fast Gradient Sign (FGS) method) in the untargeted attack setting as
xadv = x+  · sign(∇x`fs(x, y)), (10)
where `fs(x, y) is the loss function with respect to which the gradient is taken. The loss function
typically used is the cross-entropy loss (Goodfellow et al., 2016). Adversarial samples generated
using the targeted FGS attack are
xadv = x−  · sign(∇x`fs(x, T )), (11)
where T is the target class.
Iterative Fast Gradient methods are simply multi-step variants of the Fast Gradient method described
above (Kurakin et al., 2016), where the gradient of the loss is added to the sample for t+ 1 iterations,
starting from the benign sample, and the updated sample is projected to satisfy the constraintsH in
every step:
xt+1adv = ΠH(x
t
adv + α · sign(∇xtadv`fs(xtadv, y))), (12)
with x0adv = x. Iterative fast gradient methods thus essentially carry out projected gradient descent
(PGD) with the goal of maximizing the loss, as pointed out by Ma˛dry et al. (2017). Targeted
adversarial samples generated using iterative FGS are
xt+1adv = ΠH(x
t
adv − α · sign(∇xtadv`fs(xtadv, T ))). (13)
6.2.1 BEYOND THE CROSS-ENTROPY LOSS
Prior work by Carlini & Wagner (2017) investigates a variety of loss functions for white-box attacks
based on the minimization of an appropriately defined loss function. In our experiments with neural
networks, for untargeted attacks, we use a loss function based on logits which was found to work
well for white-box attacks in Carlini & Wagner (2017). The loss function is given by
`(x, y) = max(φ(x+ δ)y −max{φ(x+ δ)i : i 6= y},−κ), (14)
where y represents the ground truth label for the benign sample x, φ(·) are the logits. κ is a confidence
parameter that can be adjusted to control the strength of the adversarial sample. Targeted adversarial
samples are generated using the following loss term:
xadv = x−  · sign(∇x(max(φ(x)i : i 6= T )− φ(x)T )). (15)
6.3 TRANSFERABILITY BASED ATTACKS
Here we describe black-box attacks that assume the adversary has access to a representative set of
training data in order to train a local model. One of the earliest observations with regards to adversarial
samples for neural networks was that they transfer; i.e, adversarial attack samples generated for one
network are also adversarial for another network. This observation directly led to the proposal of a
black-box attack where an adversary would generate samples for a local network and transfer these
to the target model, which is referred to as a Transferability based attack. Targeted transferability
attacks are carried out using locally generated targeted white-box adversarial samples.
6.3.1 SINGLE LOCAL MODEL
These attacks use a surrogate local model fs to craft adversarial samples, which are then submitted
to f in order to cause misclassification. Most existing black-box attacks are based on transferability
from a single local model (Papernot et al., 2016; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016). The different attack
strategies to generate adversarial instances introduced in Section 6.2 can be used here to generate
adversarial instances against fs, so as to attack f .
6.3.2 ENSEMBLE OF LOCAL MODELS
Since it is not clear which local model fs is best suited for generating adversarial samples that
transfer well to the target model f , Liu et al. (2017) propose the generation of adversarial examples
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for an ensemble of local models. This method modifies each of the existing transferability attacks by
substituting a sum over the loss functions in place of the loss from a single local model.
Concretely, let the ensemble ofm local models to be used to generate the local loss be {fs1 , . . . , fsm}.
The ensemble loss is then computed as `ens(x, y) =
∑m
i=1 αi`fsi (x, y), where αi is the weight
given to each model in the ensemble. The FGS attack in the ensemble setting then becomes
xadv = x+  · sign(∇x`ens(x, y)). The Iterative FGS attack is modified similarly. Liu et al. (2017)
show that the Transferability attack (local model ensemble) performs well even in the targeted attack
case, while Transferability attack (single local model) is usually only effective for untargeted attacks.
The intuition is that while one model’s gradient may not be adversarial for a target model, it is likely
that at least one of the gradient directions from the ensemble represents a direction that is somewhat
adversarial for the target model.
Untargeted Transferability to Model A
Single-step Iterative
Source FGS-xent FGS-logit IFGS-xent IFGS-logit
B 66.3 (6.2) 80.8 (6.3) 89.8 (4.75) 88.5 (4.75)
B,C 68.1 (6.2) 89.8 (6.3) 95.0 (4.8) 97.1 (4.9)
B,C,D 56.0 (6.3) 88.7 (6.4) 73.5 (5.3) 94.4 (5.3)
Targeted Transferability to Model A
Single-step Iterative
Source FGS-T (xent) FGS-T (logit) IFGS-T (xent) IFGS-T (logit)
B 18.3 (6.3) 18.1 (6.3) 54.5 (4.6) 46.5 (4.2)
B,C 23.0 (6.3) 23.0 (6.3) 76.7 (4.8) 72.3 (4.5)
B,C,D 25.2 (6.4) 25.1 (6.4) 74.6 (4.9) 66.1 (4.7)
Table 6: Adversarial success rates for transferability-based attacks on Model A (MNIST) at
 = 0.3. Numbers in parentheses beside each entry give the average distortion ∆(X,Xadv) over the
test set. This table compares the effectiveness of using a single local model to generate adversarial
examples versus the use of a local ensemble.
6.3.3 TRANSFERABILITY ATTACK RESULTS
For the transferability experiments, we choose to transfer from Model B for MNIST dataset and
from Resnet-28-10 for CIFAR-10 dataset, as these models are each similar to at least one of the
other models for their respective dataset and different from one of the others. They are also fairly
representative instances of DNNs used in practice.
Adversarial samples generated using single-step methods and transferred from Model B to the other
models have higher success rates for untargeted attacks when they are generated using the logit loss
as compared to the cross entropy loss as can be seen in Table 1. For iterative adversarial samples,
however, the untargeted attack success rates are roughly the same for both loss functions. As has been
observed before, the adversarial success rate for targeted attacks with transferability is much lower
than the untargeted case, even when iteratively generated samples are used. On the MNIST dataset,
the highest targeted transferability rate is 54.5% (Table 2) as compared to 89.8% in the untargeted
case (Table 1).
One attempt to improve the transferability rate is to use an ensemble of local models, instead of
a single one. The results for this on the MNIST data are presented in Table 6. In general, both
untargeted and targeted transferability increase when an ensemble is used. However, the increase is
not monotonic in the number of models used in the ensemble, and we can see that the transferability
rate for IFGS-xent samples falls sharply when Model D is added to the ensemble. This may be
due to it having a very different architecture as compared to the models, and thus also having very
different gradient directions. This highlights one of the pitfalls of transferability, where it is important
to use a local surrogate model similar to the target model for achieving high attack success rates.
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7 CONCLUSION
Overall, in this paper, we conduct a systematic analysis of new and existing black-box attacks on
state-of-the-art classifiers and defenses. We propose Gradient Estimation attacks which achieve high
attack success rates comparable with even white-box attacks and outperform other state-of-the-art
black-box attacks. We apply random grouping and PCA based methods to reduce the number of
queries required to a small constant and demonstrate the effectiveness of the Gradient Estimation
attack even in this setting. We also apply our black-box attack against a real-world classifier and
state-of-the-art defenses. All of our results show that Gradient Estimation attacks are extremely
effective in a variety of settings, making the development of better defenses against black-box attacks
an urgent task.
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A ALTERNATIVE ADVERSARIAL SUCCESS METRIC
Note that the adversarial success rate can also be computed by considering only the fraction of inputs
that meet the adversary’s objective given that the original sample was correctly classified. That is,
one would count the fraction of correctly classified inputs (i.e. f(x) = y) for which f(xadv) 6= y
in the untargeted case, and f t(xadv) = T in the targeted case. In a sense, this fraction represents
those samples which are truly adversarial, since they are misclassified solely due to the adversarial
perturbation added and not due to the classifier’s failure to generalize well. In practice, both these
methods of measuring the adversarial success rate lead to similar results for classifiers with high
accuracy on the test data.
B FORMAL DEFINITIONS FOR QUERY-BASED ATTACKS
Here, we provide a unified framework assuming an adversary can make active queries to the model.
Existing attacks making zero queries are a special case in this framework. Given an input instance x,
the adversary makes a sequence of queries based on the adversarial constraint setH, and iteratively
adds perturbations until the desired query results are obtained, using which the corresponding
adversarial example xadv is generated.
We formally define the targeted and untargeted black-box attacks based on the framework as below.
Definition 1 (Untargeted black-box attack). Given an input instance x and an iterative active
query attack strategy A, a query sequence can be generated as x2 = A({(x1, q1f )},H), ..., xi =
A({(x1, q1f ), . . . , (xi−1, qi−1f )},H), where qif denotes the ith corresponding query result on xi, and
we set x1 = x. A black-box attack on f(·; θ) is untargeted if the adversarial example xadv = xk
satisfies f(xadv; θ) 6= f(x; θ), where k is the number of queries made.
Definition 2 (Targeted black-box attack). Given an input instance x and an iterative active
query attack strategy A, a query sequence can be generated as x2 = A({(x1, q1f )},H), ...,
xi = A({(x1, q1f ), . . . , (xi−1, qi−1f )},H), where qif denotes the ith corresponding query result
on xi, and we set x1 = x. A black-box attack on f(·; θ) is targeted if the adversarial example
xadv = x
k satisfies f(xadv; θ) = T , where T and k are the target class and the number of queries
made, respectively.
The case where the adversary makes no queries to the target classifier is a special case we refer to as
a zero-query attack. In the literature, a number of these zero-query attacks have been carried out with
varying degrees of success (Papernot et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2017; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016;
Mopuri et al., 2017).
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Attack Abbreviation Untargeted Targeted
B
la
ck
-b
ox
Z
er
o-
qu
er
y
Random-Gaussian-perturbation Rand. +
Difference-of-means D. of M. + +
Transfer from model Surrogate attack Steps Loss function
FGS Single-step Cross-entropy Transfer model FGS-xent + +
Logit-based Transfer model FGS-logit + +
IFGS Iterative Cross-entropy Transfer model IFGS-xent + +
Logit-based Transfer model IFGS-logit + +
Q
ue
ry
ba
se
d
Finite-difference gradient estimation Steps Loss function
Single-step Cross-entropy FD-xent + +
Logit-based FD-logit + +
Iterative Cross-entropy IFD-xent + +
Logit-based IFD-logit + +
Query-reduced gradient estimation Technique Steps Loss function
Random grouping Single-step Logit-based GE-QR (RG-k, logit) + +
Iterative Logit-based IGE-QR (RG-k, logit) + +
PCA Single-step Logit-based GE-QR (PCA-k, logit) + +
Iterative Logit-based IGE-QR (PCA-k, logit) + +
W
hi
te
-b
ox
Fast gradient sign (FGS) Steps Loss function
Single-step Cross-entropy WB FGS-xent + +
Logit-based WB FGS-logit + +
Iterative Cross-entropy WB IFGS-xent + +
Logit-based WB IFGS-logit + +
Table 7: Attacks evaluated in this paper
C SUMMARY OF ATTACKS EVALUATED
Taxonomy of black-box attacks: To deepen our understanding of the effectiveness of black-box
attacks, in this work, we propose a taxonomy of black-box attacks, intuitively based on the number of
queries on the target model used in the attack. The details are provided in Table 7.
We evaluate the following attacks summarized in Table 7:
1. Zero-query attacks
(a) Baseline attacks: Random-Gaussian perturbations (Rand.) and Difference-of-Means
aligned perturbations (D. of M.)
(b) Transferability attack (single local model) using Fast Gradient Sign (FGS) and Iterative
FGS (IFGS) samples generated on a single source model for both loss functions
(Transfer model FGS/IFGS-loss); e.g., Transfer Model A FGS-logit
(c) Transferability attack (local model ensemble) using FGS and IFGS samples generated
on a source model for both loss functions (Transfer models FGS/IFGS-loss); e.g.,
Transfer Model B, Model C IFGS-logit
2. Query based attacks
(a) Finite-difference and Iterative Finite-difference attacks for the gradient estimation
attack for both loss functions (FD/IFD-loss); e.g., FD-logit
(b) Gradient Estimation and Iterative Gradient Estimation with Query reduction attacks
(IGE/GE-QR (Technique-k, loss)) using two query reduction techniques, random
grouping (RG) and principal component analysis components (PCA); e.g., GE-QR
(PCA-k, logit)
3. White-box FGS and IFGS attacks for both loss functions (WB FGS/IFGS (loss))
D WHITE-BOX ATTACK RESULTS
In this section, we present the white-box attack results for various cases in Tables 8–10. Where
relevant, our results match previous work (Goodfellow et al., 2015; Kurakin et al., 2016).
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MNIST White-box
Single-step Iterative
Model FGS (xent) FGS (logit) IFGS (xent) IFGS (logit)
A 69.2 (5.9) 90.1 (5.9) 99.5 (4.4) 100.0 (2.1)
B 84.7 (6.2) 98.8 (6.3) 100.0 (4.75) 100.0 (1.6)
C 67.9 (6.1) 76.5 (6.6) 100.0 (4.7) 100.0 (2.2)
D 98.3 (6.3) 100.0 (6.5) 100.0 (5.6) 100.0 (1.2)
CIFAR-10 White-box
Single-step Iterative
Model FGS (xent) FGS (logit) IFGS (xent) IFGS (logit)
Resnet-32 82.6 (439.7) 86.8 (438.3) 100.0 (247.2) 100.0 (66.1)
Resnet-28-10 86.4 (439.6) 87.4 (439.2) 100.0 (278.7) 100.0 (75.4)
Std.-CNN 93.9 (439.6) 98.5 (429.8) 98.0 (314.3) 100.0 (80.3)
Table 8: Untargeted white-box attacks: adversarial success rates and average distortion ∆(X,Xadv)
over the test set. Above: MNIST,  = 0.3. Below: CIFAR-10,  = 8.
MNIST White-box
Single-step Iterative
Model FGS (xent) FGS (logit) IFGS (xent) IFGS (logit)
A 30.1 (6.1) 30.1 (6.1) 100.0 (4.7) 99.6 (2.7)
B 29.6 (6.2) 29.4 (6.3) 100.0 (4.6) 98.7 (2.4)
C 33.2 (6.4) 33.0 (6.4) 100.0 (4.6) 99.8 (3.0)
D 61.5 (6.4) 60.9 (6.3) 100.0 (4.7) 99.9 (2.0)
CIFAR-10 White-box
Single-step Iterative
Model FGS (xent) FGS (logit) IFGS (xent) IFGS (logit)
Resnet-32 23.7 (439.6) 23.5 (436.0) 100.0 (200.4) 100.0 (89.5)
Resnet-28-10 28.0 (439.6) 27.6 (436.5) 100.0 (215.7) 100.0 (99.0)
Std.-CNN 43.8 (439.5) 40.2 (435.6) 99.0 (262.4) 95.0 (127.8)
Table 9: Targeted white-box attacks: adversarial success rates and average distortion ∆(X,Xadv)
over the test set. Above: MNIST,  = 0.3. Below: CIFAR-10,  = 8.
MNIST White-box
Single-step Iterative
Model FGS (xent) FGS (logit) IFGS (xent) IFGS (logit)
Model Aadv-0.3 2.8 (6.1) 2.9 (6.0) 79.1 (4.2) 78.5 (3.1)
Model Aadv-ens-0.3 6.2 (6.2) 4.6 (6.3) 93.0 (4.1) 96.2 (2.7)
Model Aadv-iter-0.3 7.0 (6.4) 5.9 (7.5) 10.8 (3.6) 11.0 (3.6)
CIFAR-10 White-box
Single-step Iterative
Model FGS (xent) FGS (logit) IFGS (xent) IFGS (logit)
Resnet-32 adv-8 1.1 (439.7) 1.5 (438.8) 100.0 (200.6) 100.0 (73.7)
Resnet-32 adv-ens-8 7.2 (439.7) 6.6 (437.9) 100.0 (201.3) 100.0 (85.3)
Resnet-32 adv-iter-8 48.3 (438.2) 50.4 (346.6) 54.9 (398.7) 57.3 (252.4)
Table 10: Untargeted white-box attacks for models with adversarial training: adversarial success
rates and average distortion ∆(X,Xadv) over the test set. Above: MNIST,  = 0.3. Below: CIFAR-
10,  = 8.
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